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RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS  
FOR THE FIRST CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE:   
THE BTWC REVIEW CONFERENCE EXPERIENCE 
 
by Graham S. Pearson 
 
Introduction 
 
1.  Paragraph 22 of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention states that: 
 
22.  The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth and the 
tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention ... convene in special sessions 
to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.  Such reviews shall take 
into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. [Emphasis 
added] 
 
The first such special session, referred to in this paper as the First Review Conference, is 
scheduled to commence on 28 April 2003. 
 
2.  As the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has been in force since 1975 
and has had five Review Conferences at which it was necessary to "take into account any new 
scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention" it is informative and 
useful in preparing for the First CWC Review Conference to consider the experience gained 
in this respect in the BTWC regime. 
 
3.  The relevant Article of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention1 (BTWC) 
addressing the review of the Convention is Article XII which states that: 
 
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by 
a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be 
held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to 
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, 
including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being 
realized.  Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. [Emphasis added] 
 
4.   The requirement that the CWC Review Conference shall take into account any relevant 
scientific and technological developments and the closely similar requirement in the BTWC 
are not limited to any particular Article of the Convention.  Consequently, Review 
Conferences should consider such developments in respect of all Articles of the Convention 
although particular attention can be expected to be given to such developments in regard to 
the basic prohibitions in the Convention. 
 
Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Basic Prohibition 
 
                                                 
1United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, General Assembly resolution 2826 
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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5.  This paper particularly considers the way in which relevant scientific and technological 
developments have been addressed in the context of the fundamental prohibition of the 
BTWC which is set out in Article I.  This states that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; [Emphasis added] 
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
The text above in bold is the general purpose criterion which ensures that all biological 
agents and toxins, past, present and future, are embraced in the prohibition. 
 
6.  The comparable fundamental prohibition in the CWC is set out in Article I which states 
that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: 
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical 
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; 
(b) To use chemical weapons; 
 
together with the key definitions in Article II:  first, the definition of chemical weapons in 
paragraph 1 (a): 
 
1. "Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately: 
 
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes 
not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are 
consistent with such purposes; ... [Emphasis added] 
 
 and then the definition of toxic chemicals in paragraph 2: 
 
2. "Toxic Chemical" means: 
 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. 
This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method 
of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in 
munitions or elsewhere. 
 
The text in paragraph 1 (a) above in bold is the general purpose criterion which ensures that 
all chemical agents, past, present and future, are embraced by the prohibition. 
 
7.  Both Conventions are similar in having all-embracing general purpose criteria -- and, 
consequently, the extended understandings developed in relation to the basic prohibition at 
successive BTWC Review Conferences are informative when considering what the First 
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CWC Review Conference might adopt in its Final Declaration.  There is considerable 
relevance between the CWC and the BTWC for a number of reasons.  First, there is a close 
relationship between chemical and biological weapons which is shown by the CBW 
spectrum: 
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This shows that the two Conventions -- the CWC and the BTWC -- rightly overlap in the  
area of toxins as well as in the area of bioregulators and peptides with the CWC listing two 
toxins -- ricin and saxitoxin in Schedule 1.  Furthermore, both Conventions address dual-use 
materials and technology, both totally prohibit a class of weapons which cause death or harm 
to humans and animals primarily through inhalation or ingestion, and both have general 
purpose criteria in their basic prohibition. 
 
8.  At successive BTWC Review Conferences, the language in the Final Declaration in 
Article I regarding scientific and technological developments has been developed.   
 
9.   Thus at the First BTWC Review Conference in 1980, the Final Declaration2 in this 
respect in Article I simply stated that: 
 
The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to have 
covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. 
 
Unlike all subsequent BTWC Review Conferences, no language was included in respect of 
the implications of scientific and technological developments in regard to either 
apprehensions about or the scope of the Convention. 
 
10.  By the Second BTWC Review Conference in 1986, the Final Declaration3 contained 
stronger language and had developed into two paragraphs -- one addressing apprehensions:  
                                                 
2United Nations, Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 3 - 21 
March 1980, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.1/10, Geneva, 1980.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
3United Nations, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
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The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that 
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments. [Emphasis added] 
 
and the other making a clear reaffirmation as to the scope of the Convention: 
 
The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or 
artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production.  Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and non-
proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically 
produced analogues are covered. [Emphasis added] 
 
11.  The first paragraph addressed apprehensions arising from developments inter alia in the 
fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology and reaffirmed that the 
undertakings in Article I, the basic prohibition, applied to all such developments.  The second 
paragraph addressing the scope has two sentences.  The first sentence reaffirming that the 
Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created agents whatever their 
origin or method of production thereby emphasizing the all embracing scope of the 
Convention.  The second sentence is an explanatory one that makes it clear that toxins of a 
microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically produced analogues are covered. 
 
12.   At the Third BTWC Review Conference in 1991 the Final Declaration4 contained 
similar language, on this occasion combined into a single paragraph: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that 
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments.  The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally 
covers all microbial agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, 
whatever their origin or method of production.  [Emphasis added] 
 
The first sentence repeated the apprehensions addressed at the Second Review Conference 
using identical language referring to microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology.  
The second sentence reaffirmed the scope which was further extended by addition of the 
words "or altered".  
 
13.   At the Fourth BTWC Review Conference in 1996 the Final Declaration5 was 
broadened, and again was in two paragraphs, one addressing apprehensions: 
                                                                                                                                                       
Destruction, 8th - 26th September 1986, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.II/13, Geneva, 1986. Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
4United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9 - 27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1991.  Available at http://www. 
opbw.org 
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The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. [Emphasis added] 
 
and the other reaffirming the scope: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes. [Emphasis added] 
 
In the apprehensions paragraph, the developments to which the undertaking in Article I 
applied inter alia in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic 
engineering and any application resulting from genome studies, were broadened by the 
addition of molecular biology and of any application resulting from genome studies.   The 
scope paragraph was also extended from that in 1986 by the addition of "as well as their 
components." 
 
14.  For the Fifth BTWC Review Conference which started on 19 November 2001 and was 
adjourned on 7 December 2001 until 11 November 2002, various proposals have been put 
forward for both the apprehensions and the scope paragraphs.  One set of such proposals put 
forward by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford emerged from 
debate and discussions held at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop6 entitled "New 
Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention" held in Prague on 31 May to 2 June 2001.   This focussed on the 
consideration of what advances might usefully be specifically referred to in the Final 
Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference both in regard to the reaffirmation of the scope 
and in addressing apprehensions in order to ensure that there are no perceived omissions or 
exclusions which might be exploited in a way that is inconsistent with the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention.   
 
15.   During the Workshop, there was a shared recognition among the participants that the 
language relating to scientific and technological developments in Article I in the Final 
Declarations of previous Review Conferences had hitherto comprised a reaffirmation of the 
scope sometimes together with an explanatory sentence and an apprehensions paragraph 
with its listing following the words inter alia of particular broad areas.   Initial ideas at the 
Workshop began with consideration of an extension of the listing of areas in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
5United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva 1996. Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
6A personal report of this NATO Advanced Research Workshop is available as Graham S. Pearson, New 
Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Fifth Review Conference.  Review Conference 
Paper No. 3, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, July 2001. Available at http:// 
www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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apprehensions paragraph which started from that in the Final Declaration of the Fourth 
Review Conference: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
and which was, during the Workshop, conceptually gradually extended by additional terms: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering, neuroscience, bioinformatics and databases, 
and any application resulting from genome and proteome studies and derived 
techniques, and biological control in animals and plants as well as humans, and the 
possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the 
provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States 
Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
  
This led to the appreciation that an ever longer listing could be impracticable.  It consequently 
would be preferable to use a broader term "life sciences" in the apprehensions paragraph 
which could be accompanied by an explanatory sentence concerning particular recent 
developments.  In addition, it was recognized that the emphasis in the previous Final 
Declarations had tended to ignore concerns relating to animals and plants.  It was 
consequently felt that there would be benefits from inclusion of specific language to make it 
clear that the scientific and technological developments that could be of concern apply to 
animals and plants as well as to human beings: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the life sciences in animals and plants as 
well as humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the 
objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given 
by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. Consequently, 
biological control, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics and databases and their 
applications are covered. 
 
16.  Insofar as the reaffirmation of the scope paragraph in Article I in the Final Declaration 
was concerned, it was considered that this could usefully build upon that adopted at the 
Fourth Review Conference together with an explanatory sentence as at the Second Review 
Conference to read as follows: 
 
 The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or 
altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, 
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes. Consequently, prions, proteins and bioregulators and their 
synthetically produced analogues and components are covered. 
 
The explanatory sentence would make it clear that certain developments were included: 
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 Consequently, biological control, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics and 
databases and their applications are covered. 
 
This additional sentence would eliminate any doubt as to the scope of the Convention in 
covering these rapidly developing fields of the life sciences. 
 
17.  These developments at successive BTWC Review Conferences can usefully be 
summarised, thereby showing the developments in the language in the Article I section of the 
Final Declarations, as follows for the scope: 
 
Convention 
(Article I) 
Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
First Rev Con The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently 
comprehensive to have covered recent scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. 
Second Rev Con ... the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially 
created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production.  
Third Rev Con ... the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial agents or toxins, 
naturally or artificially created or altered, whatever their origin or method 
of production.  
Fourth Rev Con ... the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological 
agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as 
their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types 
and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes. 
 
whilst in regard to the apprehensions: 
 
Convention Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
First Rev Con The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently 
comprehensive to have covered recent scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. 
Second Rev Con ... apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological 
developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering 
and biotechnology, 
Third Rev Con ... apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological 
developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering 
and biotechnology,  
Fourth Rev Con ... apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological 
developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from 
genome studies, 
 
 
The Process used to Address Scientific and Technological Developments 
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18.  In considering how relevant scientific and technological developments may be taken into 
account at the First CWC Review Conference, it is worth taking note of the process which 
has been used at the BTWC Review Conferences to address relevant scientific and 
technological developments.   
 
19.  Background Papers on Relevant Scientific and Technological Developments.  The 
Preparatory Committee for the First BTWC Review Conference met in July 1979 and 
decided7 to request the Depositary Governments to prepare a background paper on new 
scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, and to request the 
Secretary of the Committee to invite the comments of States Parties concerning that paper.  
The Committee further decided to invite States Parties who wished to do so to submit their 
views on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.  Finally, 
the Committee decided to request the Secretary of the Committee to compile the comments of 
States Parties on the paper prepared by the Depositary Governments, together with national 
contributions on that subject.  This resulted in a background paper (BWC/CONF.I/5) 
submitted by the Depositary Governments on the scientific and technological developments 
relevant to the Convention together with a paper (BWC/CONF.I/6) entitled "Views of States 
Parties on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention." 
 
20.  For subsequent BTWC Review Conferences, the Preparatory Committee has, as in 2001, 
"also decided to invite States Parties that wished to do so, including the Depositary 
Governments, to submit to the Secretariat information on new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention.  This information should cover the applications 
being made of such developments and their relevance to the various aspects of the 
Convention."8   The due date for the circulation of background documentation was decided by 
the Preparatory Committee as being "not later than four weeks before the opening of the 
Conference."  In practice, background documentation is circulated when it is received which 
may be as late as during the Review Conference. 
 
21.  For the First CWC Review Conference it is understood that background papers are being 
prepared by the Technical Secretariat and that the Scientific Advisory Board are considering 
the relevant scientific and technological developments.  It would, however, be highly 
desirable that the States Parties to the CWC be invited to submit national background papers 
on relevant scientific and technological developments and that these should, as in the 
comparable BTWC Preparatory Committee invitations, "cover the applications being made of 
such developments and their relevance to the various aspects of the Convention."  An 
appropriate date by which such background papers should be submitted to and circulated by 
the Technical Secretariat should be specified.  Ideally this should be about three months prior 
to the Review Conference to enable States Parties to review and consider them. 
 
                                                 
7United Nations, Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 3 - 21 
March 1980, Organization and Work of the Review Conference, BWC/CONF.1/10, Geneva, 1980, p.2, para 8.  
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
8United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/PC/1, 1 May 2001, p.4, para 22. Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
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22.. For the Fourth BTWC Review Conference in 1996, seven States Parties submitted 
background scientific and technological development papers9, which varied in length and 
scope:   
 
a.  Cuba provided three pages of information on the work carried out by nine Cuban 
centres or laboratories 
 
b.  Finland provided a line saying that "she had not made any scientific and 
technological developments relevant to the Convention." 
 
c.  Switzerland provided two pages noting that biotechnology and genetechnology 
had revolutionized (and is still doing so) many areas of biological and medical 
sciences and outlining the developments in recombinant DNA and monoclonal 
antibodies as well as in biological toxins. 
 
d.  The United Kingdom provided 11 pages which provided a comprehensive 
appraisal of the developments of relevance to the BTWC. Separate sections addressed 
detection technologies, genetic developments, vaccines, trends in infectious diseases 
and their treatment, industrial microbiology and microbial control of pests. 
 
e.  The United States of America provided 8 pages which provided a review of the 
technological developments of relevance to the BTWC.  A section on advances in 
industrial application of biotechnology included sections on modified micro-
organisms (with subsections on toxins, peptides), and advances in production (with 
subsections on mammalian cell culture, continuous flow fermenters, hollow-
technology fibre and safety and environmental standards).  A section on advances in 
analytical and vaccine technology included sections on developments in assay 
technology and DNA vaccines.   Another section addressed other technological 
advances including phage libraries and information networks whilst a further section 
on outbreaks of infectious disease included AIDS and Ebola virus. 
 
f.  Sweden provided 6 pages which provided an overview of developments of 
relevance to the Convention.  Separate sections addressed disease causing 
mechanisms, large-scale production, release of genetically modified microorganisms 
in the environment, new antibacterial and antiviral agents, vaccines, and 
identification, diagnosis and detection. 
 
g.  Germany provided a page on scientific and technical progress in providing 
protection from biological weapons. 
 
Some of these background papers on scientific and technological developments include value 
judgements whilst others do not. The inclusion of value judgements about the significance of 
the scientific and technological developments to the BTWC are beneficial as they help to 
better inform other States Parties.   It should, however, be noted that there is correctly no 
linkage between the information provided in the background scientific and technological 
development papers and the Final Declaration of the BTWC Review Conference.   The 
                                                 
9These background papers are available in United Nations, Background Paper on New Scientific and 
Technological Developments relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.IV/4, 
Add.1 and Add.2. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
 
12 
background scientific and technological development papers do, however, inform both the 
States Parties who consult together in putting forward proposals for language for inclusion in 
the Final Declaration as well as the States Parties who negotiate and agree the language in the 
Final Declaration.  
 
23.  For the Fifth BTWC Review Conference, five States Parties submitted background 
scientific and technological development papers10, which again varied in length and scope:   
 
a.  Bulgaria provided a page on the work of the National Centre for Infectious and 
parasitic Diseases and on the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. 
 
b.  South Africa provided six pages on scientific and technological developments 
relating to biocontrol agents and plant inoculants. 
 
c.  Sweden provided five pages noting that development in the field of biotechnology 
continued to be fast and innovative especially in the field of medicine.  Separate 
sections addressed genomics, proteomics and treatment of disease; vaccines; 
industrial microbiology and production; and identification of disease causing agents. 
 
d. United Kingdom provided 28 pages noting that it was considered important to 
review "progress in genetics knowledge and applications relating to micro-organisms, 
toxins and infectious disease, which amounts to an explosion of achievement and 
potential since the 1996 Review Conference."  An Annex is provided with sections on 
genomics and proteomics;  bioinformatics;  human genome project and human 
diversity; gene therapy;  virulence and pathogenicity;  vaccines and novel therapies;  
recombined protein expression;  toxins and other bioactive molecules;  detection and 
identification technologies;  human infectious disease patterns;  smallpox destruction; 
drug resistance;  disease in agriculture;  pest control in agriculture;  global initiative to 
tackle disease;  molecular biology applications and crops;  trends in protein 
production technologies;  international cooperation and biosafety: activities under the 
Biodiversity Convention;  means of delivery of agents or toxins;  use of pathogens to 
control weeds and 'criminal' crops; bioremediation: the destruction of materiel; 
countering the threat of bioterrorism;  and the impact of entry into force of the CWC. 
 
e.  United States provided ten pages noting that the pace of advances in 
biotechnology will increase.  Separate sections are provided on  biocontrol agents;  
bioremediation;  natural attenuation;  environmental modification;  bioaugmentation;  
vaccines;  vaccine delivery systems;  viral tropisms;  bioinformatics;  microbial 
genomics;  toxicogenomics;  proteomics;  DNA shuffling;  DNA microarrays;  
outbreaks of infectious diseases;  prion diseases;  foot and mouth disease;  and West 
Nile Fever virus. 
 
As at previous Review Conferences, some of these background papers on scientific and 
technological developments include value judgements whilst others do not.  
 
                                                 
10These background papers are available in United Nations, Background Paper on New Scientific and 
Technological Developments relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/4 and 
Add.1. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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24.  At the BTWC Review Conferences, the States Parties engaged in the Review Conference 
submit proposals to the Committee of the Whole for language to be incorporated into the 
Final Declaration.   Some of these proposals relate to the relevant scientific and technological 
developments in regard to Article I.  Thus at the Fourth BTWC Review Conference 
proposals11 were put forward in the Committee of the Whole for the Article I section of the 
Final Declaration by: 
 
a.  Chile who proposed: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial and other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially 
created or altered, whatever their origin or method of production, as well as 
chemical components and products of living organisms and their analogs and 
modified derivatives, whether isolated, synthesized, cloned or produced by any 
combination or means, with a capacity for generating potentially adverse 
physiological effects. 
 
b.  United States who proposed language identical to that in the Final Declaration of 
the previous (Third) Review Conference: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, 
genetic engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for 
purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, 
reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies 
to all such developments.  The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention 
unequivocally covers all microbial agents or toxins, naturally or artificially 
created or altered, whatever their origin or method of production.   
 
25.  As already noted above, the eventually agreed Final Declaration contained two 
paragraphs: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.   
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
These had been developed from the proposals put to the Committee of the Whole. 
 
                                                 
11United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva 1996, Part III, pp. 41 -43. 
 
14 
The First Review Conference of the CWC 
 
26.  Although the outcome of the First CWC Review Conference is not yet determined, there 
is much to be said for a Final Declaration agreed by the States Parties being the outcome of 
the First Review Conference.  Such a Final Declaration would parallel the outcome of other 
Conventions such as the BTWC and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would enable 
the CWC regime to benefit from the extended understandings that arise from such Final 
Declarations.   It is understood12 that the open-ended Working Group on the preparations for 
the Review Conference has selected some nine themes or clusters of issues to form the 
framework of the review process which include: 
 
• General issues, including emerging challenges such as chemical terrorism and 
universality, and 
 
• Impact of scientific and technological developments on the basic provisions of the 
Convention.  
 
It is therefore probable that the Final Declaration of the First CWC Review Conference will 
include language that addresses the implications of relevant scientific and technological 
developments on the basic prohibitions of the Convention. 
 
27.  As already noted above, the key elements of Article II in this respect are the definition of 
chemical weapons in paragraph 1 (a): 
 
1. "Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately: 
 
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes 
not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are 
consistent with such purposes; ... [Emphasis added] 
 
 and the definition of toxic chemicals in paragraph 2: 
 
2. "Toxic Chemical" means: 
 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. 
This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method 
of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in 
munitions or elsewhere. 
 
28.  In the light of the experience gained at the BTWC Review Conferences, it is evident that 
the Final Declaration of the First CWC Review Conference could -- and, it is to be hoped, 
should -- reaffirm that the definition of toxic chemicals is all embracing underlining the 
inclusion of any chemical which can cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
permanent harm to humans or animals and that this includes all such chemicals, 
                                                 
12See Pamela Mills, Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Progress in 
The Hague, Quarterly Review no 37, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 55, March 2002 and Pamela Mills, 
The First Review Process of the Chemical Weapons Convention, an Update, Working Paper for Pugwash 
meeting no. 270, 17th CBW Workshop, The Impending First CWC Review, Oegstgeest, The Netherlands, 15 - 
16 June 2002. 
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regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether 
they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. 
 
29.  Given the immense developments during the last few years in the identification and 
evaluation of new chemicals using techniques such as combinatorial chemistry, supported 
synthesis, proteomics and genomics together with chemo-informatics as well as in new 
methods for the synthesis and production of both known and new chemicals using techniques 
such as automated process control and mini/micro reactors, there would be benefits in the 
Final Declaration of the First CWC Review Conference including an apprehensions 
paragraph which could be along the following lines, where the words in bold would need to 
be negotiated: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of chemistry, combinatorial 
synthesis, biological synthesis, chemoinformatics and in applications such as 
microreactors and automated process control and the possibilities of their use for 
purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, 
reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all 
such developments.  
 
30.    In addition, there would be benefits in the Final Declaration of the First CWC Review 
Conference including a reaffirmation paragraph which could be along the following lines, 
where the words in bold would need to be negotiated:  
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production and regardless 
of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere, of types and in 
quantities that are consistent with purposes not prohibited under this Convention.   
 
In order to prevent any possible misperception that the CWC and the BTWC overlap in 
regard to prohibition of toxins, bioregulators and peptides, there could be advantage in also 
adding an explanatory sentence along the following lines: 
 
Consequently, toxins, prions, proteins, peptides and bioregulators and their 
biologically or synthetically produced analogues and components are covered. 
 
Conclusions 
 
31.  This paper has considered the First CWC Review Conference in regard to the 
implications of relevant scientific and technological developments on the basic prohibitions 
of the CWC by examining  the experience of the Review Conferences of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention in regard to the consideration of relevant scientific and 
technological developments.  The Final Declarations of the BTWC Review Conferences have 
provided shared extended understandings which have usefully reaffirmed the 
comprehensiveness of the basic prohibition in Article I of the BTWC.   It is recommended 
that the States Parties to the CWC should be invited to submit background papers on relevant 
scientific and technological developments which should cover the applications being made of 
such developments and their relevance to the various aspects of the Convention  as such 
papers can inform both the States Parties who consult together in putting forward proposals 
for language for inclusion in the Final Declaration as well as the States Parties who negotiate 
and agree the language in the Final Declaration.    Such background papers by States Parties 
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or by the Scientific Advisory Board should be posted as they are received by the OPCW 
Technical Secretariat on the Review Conference page at the opcw.org website in order to 
facilitate their consideration by all preparing for the First CWC Review Conference. 
 
32.  The States Parties to the CWC are recommended in the Final Declaration of the First 
CWC Review Conference to follow a similar approach to that followed in the Final 
Declarations of the BTWC Review Conferences as such extended understandings 
significantly strengthen the regime.   They are urged to go beyond the somewhat timid 
statement of the First BTWC Review Conference which simply stated that: 
 
The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to have 
covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. 
 
and to take the opportunity to reaffirm the comprehensiveness of the basic prohibition of the 
CWC in Articles I and II. 
 
